What Does the DORA Regulation Require From Financial Entities in Germany?
17.11.2026
The DORA regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) sets uniform requirements for information and communication technology (ICT) risk at financial entities, and it has applied directly in every Member State since 17 January 2025. In Germany, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin) supervises compliance and receives the incident reports. The regulation rests on five pillars: ICT risk management, incident management and reporting, digital operational resilience testing, ICT third-party risk, and information sharing. The scale of the topic is visible in the supervisory data. Financial entities reported 733 ICT incidents to BaFin in 2025, about 1,200 financial entities were affected by at least one incident, and about half of the problems originated at third parties (BaFin, 16 July 2026). This article explains the requirements pillar by pillar, sets out the reporting deadlines for a major ICT-related incident, and lists the evidence that the cited articles imply for a supervisory examination.
What is the DORA regulation and which financial entities must apply it in Germany?
The DORA regulation is Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector. It is a Verordnung, which means it applies directly in every Member State and needs no German transposition law. The English long form is the Digital Operational Resilience Act. The search term “DORA Richtlinie” is a misnomer, because a Richtlinie (directive) would need national transposition.
Article 2 Abs. 1 lit. a to t lists 20 types of financial entities. Three examples are credit institutions, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, and investment firms. Together, these types are the “Finanzunternehmen” of Article 2 Abs. 2. ICT third-party service providers (lit. u) form a separate group and are not financial entities under the regulation. DORA applies since 17 January 2025 (Art. 64). BaFin is the competent authority for the entities under its supervision, and the European Central Bank (ECB) supervises significant credit institutions (Art. 46). Article 4 applies the rules in proportion to size, overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of the services.
| Pillar | Key articles | What it requires in one line |
|---|---|---|
| ICT risk management | Art. 5 to 16 | A documented framework, owned by the management body, with detection, backup and recovery |
| Incident management and reporting | Art. 17 to 23 | Record, classify and report ICT-related incidents, with a report to the authority for major ones |
| Digital operational resilience testing | Art. 24 to 27 | A risk-based testing programme, plus threat-led penetration testing for selected entities |
| ICT third-party risk | Art. 28 to 44 | A register of information on all contracts, and EU oversight of critical providers |
| Information sharing | Art. 45 | Voluntary exchange of cyber threat information in trusted communities |
Which entities use the simplified framework under Art. 16?
Article 16 Abs. 1 grants a simplified ICT risk management framework to a defined group of smaller entities. The group includes small and non-interconnected investment firms, exempted payment institutions, exempted electronic money institutions, and small institutions for occupational retirement provision. Articles 5 to 15 do not apply to these entities. Five duties remain: a documented framework, continuous monitoring, incident handling, identification of third-party dependencies, continuity and regular testing. Micro-enterprises are a separate proportionality group with carve-outs in Articles 6 Abs. 4, 24 and 26. German law extends the scope through § 1a Abs. 2 and 2a of the Kreditwesengesetz (KWG, the German Banking Act). Institutions outside the DORA scope apply DORA as if they were credit institutions, with the simplified framework instead of Articles 5 to 15.
What replaced BAIT, VAIT, KAIT and ZAIT?
DORA replaced the BaFin circulars on IT requirements for banks (BAIT), insurers (VAIT), capital management companies (KAIT) and payment and e-money institutions (ZAIT). BaFin withdrew VAIT, KAIT and ZAIT at the end of 16 January 2025. BAIT is withdrawn in steps. Institutions that must run ICT risk management under Articles 5 to 15 or Article 16 DORA left the BAIT scope on 17 January 2025. The Financial Market Digitalisation Act (Finanzmarktdigitalisierungsgesetz, FinmadiG) extends the DORA duty to further institutions from 1 January 2027, and BaFin withdraws BAIT completely at the end of 31 December 2026.
How do the DORA reporting deadlines work for a major ICT-related incident?
Financial entities submit three reports to the competent authority for a major ICT-related incident: an initial notification, an intermediate report and a final report (Art. 19 Abs. 4 DORA). The time limits sit in Article 5 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301. The initial notification is due within 4 hours of classification as major and at the latest 24 hours after the entity becomes aware of the incident. The intermediate report is due at the latest 72 hours after the initial notification. The final report is due at the latest one month after the latest updated intermediate report, not one month after the initial notification.
| Report | Deadline | Core content | Article |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial notification | Within 4 hours of classification as major, at the latest 24 hours after awareness | Reference code, date and time of detection and classification, description, criteria triggered, Member States affected, how it was detected | Art. 5 Abs. 1 and 2, Art. 2 DelVO 2025/301 |
| Intermediate report | At the latest 72 hours after the initial notification, even without changes | Time of occurrence, resumption of operations, status of criteria, incident type, threat actor techniques, affected functions, financial impact on clients, indicators of compromise | Art. 5 Abs. 1, Art. 3 DelVO 2025/301 |
| Final report | At the latest one month after the latest updated intermediate report | Root cause, time of resolution, how the incident was addressed, direct and indirect costs and losses, recurring incidents | Art. 5 Abs. 1, Art. 4 DelVO 2025/301 |
Four further rules shape the practice. First, the intermediate report is also due when nothing has changed, and updates follow promptly, at the latest when normal operations resume. Second, an entity that classifies the incident later than 24 hours after awareness still reports within 4 hours of the classification (Art. 5 Abs. 2). Third, an entity that cannot meet a deadline tells the authority without delay and at the latest by the deadline, with reasons (Abs. 3). Fourth, deadlines that fall on a weekend or holiday may be met by 12:00 on the next working day, but this relief does not apply to the initial and intermediate reports of credit institutions, central counterparties, trading venues and financial entities classified as essential or important under the NIS2 Directive (Abs. 4 and 5).
The deadlines start with awareness and classification, so the speed of classification is the operational lever. BaFin data shows the cyber share of the workload: about 11% of the reported incidents were cybersecurity incidents, meaning successful attacks, and about 40% of the reported attacks targeted a service provider of the financial entity, not the entity itself (BaFin, 16 July 2026). The generic phases of a response, from detection to lessons learned, are covered in the article on incident response and its phases. This article stays with the DORA-specific duties.
When does an incident count as major?
An incident counts as major when it affects critical services and meets either the unauthorised-access threshold or at least two of the other thresholds (Art. 8 Abs. 1 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772). The unauthorised-access threshold is a successful malicious unauthorised access that may lead to data loss. Article 9 sets the other thresholds.
| Criterion | Threshold (Art. 9 DelVO 2024/1772) |
|---|---|
| Clients affected | More than 10% of the clients using the service, or more than 100,000 clients |
| Financial counterparties affected | More than 30% of the financial counterparties |
| Transactions affected | More than 10% of the average daily transactions, by number or by value |
| Reputational impact | Any reputational criterion of Article 2 |
| Duration and downtime | Duration of more than 24 hours, or downtime of services supporting critical or important functions of more than 2 hours |
| Geographical spread | Impact in 2 or more Member States |
| Data losses | Data loss with business impact |
| Economic impact | Costs and losses above or likely above EUR 100,000 |
Recurring incidents count too. Incidents that are not major on their own count as one major incident when they occurred at least twice within six months, share the same apparent cause and together meet the criteria. The entity assesses this monthly, and the rule does not apply to micro-enterprises and entities under Article 16 (Art. 8 Abs. 2). The duration of an incident runs from its occurrence to its resolution. Where the entity knew of the incident before detection, the duration runs from the moment the incident was recorded in network or system logs or other data sources (Art. 3 Abs. 1 DelVO 2024/1772). Classification therefore needs two inputs: the criticality of assets and services, and reliable log timestamps.
Where do financial entities in Germany submit reports?
Financial entities in Germany submit major incident reports to BaFin through the BaFin reporting and publishing portal (MVP portal). BaFin forwards the reports to other authorities, including the Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI), so no double reporting arises. BaFin states that DORA entities are exempt from the report under § 32 of the BSI Act (BSIG), a point explained in the section on DORA and NIS2. BaFin lists the questions of a first report: what happened, which services are affected, what the customer impact is, whether the incident is ongoing, whether a malicious act is likely, how severe the incident is, and whether other entities are affected. Estimates are allowed until the final report. Two further duties exist. Entities inform clients without delay when a major incident affects their financial interests (Art. 19 Abs. 3). Reporting significant cyber threats to the authority is voluntary (Art. 19 Abs. 2).
Which DORA requirements determine logging, detection and evidence?
Article 10 DORA requires mechanisms that detect anomalous activity promptly, alert thresholds and criteria that trigger incident response, and sufficient resources to monitor user activity, ICT anomalies and incidents, in particular cyberattacks. Article 17 requires a process to detect, manage and report incidents, including recording, classification and escalation. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 makes logging and detection concrete in its Articles 12 and 23. DORA names no tool and prescribes no technology. It defines what the entity must be able to show.
The table maps each requirement to the evidence an examiner can request. Article 6 Abs. 3 DORA obliges entities to give the competent authority complete and current information on ICT risks on request. Article 50 gives authorities access to documents and the power to inspect on site.
| Requirement | Article | Evidence an examiner can request |
|---|---|---|
| Events to log and retention period | Art. 12 DelVO 2024/1774 | Inventory of log sources, written rationale for the retention period the entity chose |
| Time synchronisation of all ICT systems | Art. 12 DelVO 2024/1774 | Documentation of the reference time source and proof that systems follow it |
| Protection of logs and detection of logging failure | Art. 12 DelVO 2024/1774 | Access controls on logs, alerts for failed log collection |
| Alert rules and priorities | Art. 10 DORA, Art. 23 DelVO 2024/1774 | Alert rule set, priority scheme, records of alert handling |
| Incident register with timestamps | Art. 17 DORA, Art. 3 DelVO 2024/1772 | Register of all ICT incidents with times of occurrence and detection |
| Classification record per incident | Art. 18 DORA, Art. 8 and 9 DelVO 2024/1772 | Classification decision with the criteria applied |
| Weekly vulnerability scans for assets supporting critical or important functions | Art. 10 DelVO 2024/1774 | Scan records and remediation tracking |
Vulnerability evidence deserves a closer look. Article 10 Abs. 2 of the delegated regulation requires automated vulnerability scans at least once a week for assets that support critical or important functions, and it requires the entity to record all identified vulnerabilities and track their remediation. A scan list alone does not show which findings matter. The article on risk-based vulnerability prioritisation with asset context explains how asset criticality turns a scan result into a ranked work list. Detection is also a weak point across the German economy. Among companies with 10 or more employees that suffered damage from cyberattacks in the last 12 months, 59% name insufficient detection of security incidents as a contributing factor (Bitkom Research, Wirtschaftsschutz 2026, n=580). The sample covers the whole German economy, not the financial sector.
What do Art. 10 DORA and Art. 12 and 23 of the delegated regulation require for logs and alerts?
Eight duties follow from Article 10 DORA and Articles 12 and 23 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774.
- Entities must define which events they log and set a retention period themselves. No statutory number of days exists.
- Entities must cover access control and identity management, capacity, change management, ICT operations and network traffic in the log scope.
- Entities must protect logs against manipulation, deletion and unauthorised access.
- Entities must detect the failure of logging systems.
- Entities must synchronise the time settings of every ICT system to a documented, reliable reference time source.
- Entities must collect, monitor and analyse logs, information from business and ICT functions, user reports, and information on potential cyber threats, including incident reports from ICT third parties.
- Entities must generate alerts at least for assets that support critical or important functions, and they must prioritise alerts so that incidents are resolved within the expected time.
- Entities must raise automatic alerts for anomalies that affect the completeness and integrity of data sources or logs.
The regulation asks for resolution “both during and outside working hours” (Art. 23 DelVO 2024/1774). This wording implies out-of-hours alert handling. It is a derivation from the text, not a rule that prescribes a 24/7 security operations centre.
Which capability types cover these requirements?
Five capability types cover the requirements, and none of them guarantees compliance. DORA certifies no product, and small entities can meet parts of the duties with manual procedures under the proportionality principle of Article 4.
| Capability type | DORA need it supports | Article |
|---|---|---|
| Log collection and correlation (SIEM, security information and event management) | Detection of anomalies, log scope, retention, alerting | Art. 10 DORA, Art. 12 and 23 DelVO 2024/1774 |
| Response orchestration and ticketing (SOAR, security orchestration, automation and response) | Incident process, escalation, preparation of reports | Art. 17 to 19 DORA |
| Vulnerability management | Weekly scans, tracking of remediation | Art. 10 DelVO 2024/1774 |
| Risk management and asset records (CMDB, configuration management database) | Identification of critical functions, classification input | Art. 6 to 8 DORA |
| Threat intelligence | Threat-based alerting, information sharing | Art. 23 DelVO 2024/1774, Art. 45 DORA |
How do DORA and NIS2 apply to the same financial entity in Germany?
DORA is the lex specialis to the NIS2 Directive (Erwägungsgrund 16 DORA), which means DORA takes precedence for financial entities. For financial entities identified as essential or important under NIS2, DORA counts as a sector-specific act of the Union (Art. 1 Abs. 2 DORA). Under Article 4 Abs. 1 of the NIS2 Directive, the relevant NIS2 provisions then do not apply, including supervision and enforcement, where the sector-specific act is at least equivalent.
German law implements this in § 28 Abs. 6 Nr. 1 BSIG. The provision states that §§ 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38 and 39 BSIG do not apply to financial entities under Article 2 Abs. 2 DORA. It also covers undertakings that apply DORA under § 1a Abs. 2 and 2a KWG or § 293 Abs. 5 of the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG, the German Insurance Supervision Act).
| Question | Answer for a DORA entity | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Which law sets the ICT risk management duty? | DORA, Art. 5 to 16 | Art. 1 Abs. 2 DORA, § 28 Abs. 6 BSIG |
| Where are major incidents reported? | To BaFin under Art. 19 DORA | BaFin, § 28 Abs. 6 BSIG |
| Who is accountable for the framework? | The management body under Art. 5 DORA, not under § 38 BSIG | § 28 Abs. 6 Nr. 1 BSIG |
| Are ICT third-party providers covered by the exclusion? | No, they are not financial entities under Art. 2 Abs. 2 DORA | Art. 2 DORA |
Two clarifications apply. The list in § 28 Abs. 6 does not contain § 33 BSIG, the registration duty, so the exclusion does not extend to registration with the BSI. ICT third-party providers can fall under NIS2 and the BSIG themselves. The BSI and BaFin exchange information, in particular on measures taken under DORA (§ 3 Abs. 1 Nr. 29 BSIG). The article on the NIS2 directive and its obligations covers the NIS2 side in full.
What does DORA require for ICT risk management and governance?
DORA requires financial entities to keep a documented ICT risk management framework as part of their overall risk management (Art. 6 Abs. 1), and it places the governance of that framework with the management body (Art. 5). The management body is the Leitungsorgan, the body that directs the entity, such as the Vorstand or the Geschäftsleitung. Article 5 Abs. 2 lit. a states that it carries the final responsibility for ICT risk management. Four duties follow from Article 5 and Article 6.
- The management body defines, approves, oversees and answers for the framework. It approves the digital operational resilience strategy and the risk tolerance (lit. d), the budget (lit. g) and the policy on ICT third-party arrangements (lit. h).
- Members of the management body keep their ICT knowledge and skills up to date, including regular specific training (Art. 5 Abs. 4).
- Non-micro entities assign the management and oversight of ICT risk to a control function with an appropriate level of independence (Art. 6 Abs. 4).
- The framework is reviewed at least once a year and after major incidents and supervisory findings (Art. 6 Abs. 5). Internal audit examines it (Art. 6 Abs. 6).
The control function is not a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The word CISO does not occur in the DORA text. Backup and recovery complete the pillar: Article 12 requires documented backup policies and recovery methods, and it requires that restores use ICT systems that are physically and logically segregated from the source system (Art. 12 Abs. 3). Three groups in the entity carry different parts. The management body carries accountability. The compliance or risk function keeps the framework and the review record. The ICT team runs the controls and the logs. ISO 27001 and information security management is a management system standard and not a route to DORA conformity, so a certificate does not replace the DORA evidence.
What does Art. 5 Abs. 3 DORA say?
Article 5 Abs. 3 DORA requires financial entities that are not micro-enterprises to set up a function that monitors arrangements with ICT third-party service providers. The alternative is to appoint a member of senior management who is responsible for overseeing the related risk exposure and the related documentation. The duty links the governance pillar to the third-party pillar described next.
How does DORA regulate ICT third-party risk and the Informationsregister?
Financial entities stay fully responsible for compliance with DORA when they use ICT services from third parties (Art. 28 Abs. 1 lit. a), and they must keep an Informationsregister (the register of information) of all contractual arrangements for ICT services (Art. 28 Abs. 3). Four further duties follow from Article 28.
- Entities assess before signing a contract whether the service supports a critical or important function (Abs. 4).
- Non-micro entities adopt and regularly review a strategy for ICT third-party risk (Abs. 2).
- Entities hold termination rights in their contracts (Abs. 7).
- Entities prepare exit strategies for services that support critical or important functions (Abs. 8).
A critical or important function is a function whose disruption would materially impair the financial performance of the entity, the soundness or continuity of its services and activities, or its compliance with its authorisation conditions and other obligations (Art. 3 Nr. 22). Identifying these functions needs a business view of impact and dependencies, which is the purpose of a business impact analysis (BIA) for modern SOCs. The supervisory data shows why the pillar matters: about half of the reported ICT problems originated at third parties, and about 40% of the reported attacks targeted a service provider (BaFin, 16 July 2026). Providers meet DORA mainly through contract terms and through requests for register data from their financial customers.
What belongs in the Informationsregister and when is it due?
The Informationsregister lists all contractual arrangements for ICT services and marks the arrangements that support critical or important functions. BaFin sets the following process.
- Entities submit the register once a year, in full, through the MVP portal as an xBRL file or an Excel template.
- The state of the register is as of 31 December of the prior year.
- BaFin sets an annual submission window. In 2026 it ran from 9 to 30 March, with corrections possible in April. BaFin then forwards the registers to the ESAs.
- BaFin validates the submission first, then the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) validate it, which takes up to 48 hours. Test submissions are possible.
- The register contains all contracts, always the direct provider, sub-contractors that effectively support critical or important functions, and the first non-group sub-contractor for intra-group providers.
Planned arrangements that support critical or important functions must be notified in good time (Art. 28 Abs. 3). Notification duties under sector outsourcing law (KWG, VAG, the German Capital Investment Code KAGB) continue to apply.
What are critical ICT third-party providers?
Critical ICT third-party service providers are providers that the ESAs designate on criteria such as their systemic impact on the stability, continuity or quality of financial services (Art. 31). The ESAs published the first list of 19 designated critical providers on 18 November 2025. Each provider has one lead overseer among the three ESAs (the European Banking Authority EBA, EIOPA or ESMA), depending on which financial sector relies on it most. Oversight is not supervision. The financial entity stays responsible for managing the risk of a provider, whether the provider is on the list or not.
What does DORA require for resilience testing, TLPT and TIBER-DE?
Non-micro entities must run a risk-based digital operational resilience testing programme (Art. 24), and selected entities must run threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) at least every three years (Art. 26 Abs. 1). The programme includes appropriate tests of all systems and applications that support critical or important functions at least once a year (Art. 24 Abs. 6), carried out by independent parties, internal or external (Art. 24 Abs. 4). Article 25 names the test types. Three examples are vulnerability assessments and scans, scenario-based tests and network security assessments. The tests also exercise the detection mechanisms of Article 10 Abs. 1. The tested continuity plans connect to the standard on ISO 22301 and business continuity.
| Test | Who | Frequency | Article |
|---|---|---|---|
| Testing programme with tests of systems supporting critical or important functions | Non-micro financial entities | At least annually | Art. 24 Abs. 1, 4 and 6 |
| Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) | Entities identified by the authority | At least every three years, the authority may adjust the frequency | Art. 26 Abs. 1 |
| External tester for TLPT | Entities with internal testers | Every third test | Art. 26 Abs. 8 |
TLPT is a test of live production systems that simulates the tactics of real attackers. Internal testers are allowed, but an external tester must carry out every third test, and significant credit institutions use external testers only (Art. 26 Abs. 8). In Germany BaFin identifies the obliged entities and sends a Verpflichtungsbescheid (a decision that states the test frequency). A Testanordnung (test order) then sets the start of the test in coordination with the Deutsche Bundesbank. The entity delivers the Testumfangsspezifikation (test scope specification) within six months of the Testanordnung. The German method builds on TIBER-DE, the earlier national framework for threat intelligence-based red teaming. The Bundesbank accompanies the tests operationally. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 specifies the criteria for the TLPT duty.
What does DORA say about information sharing?
Article 45 DORA allows financial entities to exchange cyber threat information and intelligence on a voluntary basis. The exchange covers indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, alerts and configuration tools. It takes place within trusted communities, under arrangements for information sharing that protect business secrets and personal data under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, DSGVO). Entities inform the competent authorities of their participation. The article on threat intelligence explains the concept behind these indicators and how they feed detection.
Which sanctions apply in Germany and what does a BaFin examination ask for?
DORA contains no harmonised fine. Article 50 gives authorities supervisory, investigation and sanction powers, including access to documents, on-site inspections and remedial measures. The Member States set the administrative sanctions, which must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Authorities may also sanction members of the management body under national law. Germany regulates sanctions in its sector laws. For credit institutions, § 56 Abs. 5e and 6 KWG makes it an administrative offence, among other breaches, to submit a report under Article 19 Abs. 4 DORA incorrectly, incompletely or late, or to omit a required TLPT. The KWG applies to credit institutions only. Rules for insurers, securities firms, payment institutions and fund managers sit in other laws.
BaFin publishes no checklist of examination documents for this purpose. The following list is an editorial reading of the cited articles. It names evidence that the cited articles imply, and it is not an official BaFin list.
- Evidence of the framework: documentation and the record of the annual review (Art. 6 Abs. 3 and 5).
- Evidence of governance: approvals and training records of the management body (Art. 5).
- Evidence of incident handling: the incident register with classification and copies of submitted reports (Art. 17 to 19).
- Evidence of detection: the configuration of logging and alerting (Art. 12 and 23 DelVO 2024/1774).
- Evidence of vulnerability handling: scan and remediation records (Art. 10 DelVO 2024/1774).
- Evidence of testing: the test programme and its results, and TLPT documents where applicable (Art. 24 to 26).
- Evidence of third-party control: the Informationsregister and the ICT third-party risk strategy (Art. 28).
The three groups divide the work. Compliance owns the framework and the review record. The ICT team owns the logs, scans and incident records. The management body owns the approvals and the training record.
Frequently asked questions
The DORA regulation is Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, the Digital Operational Resilience Act. It sets uniform ICT risk management, incident reporting, testing and third-party requirements for financial entities in the EU. It applies directly in every Member State since 17 January 2025.
The five pillars of DORA are ICT risk management, incident management and reporting, digital operational resilience testing, ICT third-party risk management, and information sharing.
DORA applies since 17 January 2025 (Art. 64). The German layer follows a longer path: BaFin withdraws BAIT completely at the end of 31 December 2026, and FinmadiG extends the DORA duty to further institutions from 1 January 2027.
No. Article 6 Abs. 4 DORA requires non-micro entities to assign ICT risk management and oversight to a control function with an appropriate level of independence. The regulation prescribes no job title, and the word CISO does not occur in the DORA text or in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774.
No. DORA names no tool. It requires detection mechanisms, logging, and analysis (Art. 10 DORA, Art. 12 and 23 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774). An entity chooses the means that meet these requirements for its size and risk profile.
No. DORA entities report major incidents to BaFin under Article 19 DORA. Section 28 Abs. 6 Nr. 1 BSIG excludes them from §§ 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38 and 39 BSIG. The exclusion list does not contain the registration duty under § 33 BSIG.
The DORA regulation sets ICT requirements for financial entities in Germany across five pillars, and it attaches reporting duties with fixed deadlines to every major ICT-related incident. The initial notification follows within 4 hours of classification, the intermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, and the final report within one month of the latest updated intermediate report. The evidence base is the practical core: logs with synchronised timestamps, classified incident records, scan records, test results and the Informationsregister. BaFin recorded 733 reported ICT incidents in 2025, and DORA takes precedence over NIS2 and the BSIG for financial entities. Entities that can show these records on request meet the central expectation of the regulation.
Table of contents